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Abstract
Objectives—Pharmacy-compounded sterile preparations (P-CSPs) are frequently relied upon in 
U.S. healthcare, but are increasingly being linked to outbreaks of infections. We provide an 
updated overview of outbreak burden and characteristics, identify drivers of P-CSP demand, and 
discuss public health and patient safety lessons learned to help inform prevention.
Methods—Outbreaks of infections linked to contaminated P-CSPs that occurred between 
January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2013 were identified from internal Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention reports, Food and Drug Administration drug safety communications, and published 
literature.
Results—We identified 19 outbreaks linked to P-CSPs, resulting in at least 1000 cases, including 
deaths. Outbreaks were reported across two-thirds of states, with almost one-half (8/19) involving 
cases in more than one state. Almost one-half of outbreaks were linked to injectable steroids (5/19) 
and intraocular bevacizumab (3/19). Non-patient-specific compounding originating from non-
sterile ingredients and re-packaging of already sterile products were the most common practices 
associated with P-CSP contamination. Breaches in aseptic processing and deficiencies in 
sterilization procedures or in sterility/endotoxin testing were consistent findings. Hospital 
outsourcing, preference for variations of commercially available products, commercial drug 
shortages, and lower prices were drivers of P-CSP demand.
Conclusions—Recognized outbreaks linked to P-CSPs have been most commonly associated 
with non-patient-specific re-packaging and non-sterile to sterile compounding, and linked to lack 
of adherence to sterile compounding standards. Recently-enhanced regulatory oversight of 
compounding may improve adherence to such standards. Additional measures to limit and control 
these outbreaks include vigilance when outsourcing P-CSPs, scrutiny of drivers for P-CSP 
demand, and early recognition and notification of possible outbreaks.
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The contribution of contaminated medications to serious, and at times fatal, healthcare-
associated infections (HAIs) has become prominent in the United States healthcare delivery 
landscape. Microbial contamination of medications intended to be sterile most commonly 
results from infection control breaches at the point-of-care, for example when common 
syringes or single-use vials are shared among multiple patients. Unsafe injection practices 
such as these at the hospital bedside or in outpatient clinics have resulted in transmission of 
bacterial infections and bloodborne pathogens such as hepatitis C virus [1–3]. Upstream 
contamination of medications at the point-of-manufacture is rarer, but has also been reported 
[4,5].
Pharmacies play a crucial, intermediate role in the pathway of medications from point-of-
manufacture to point-of-care, including compounding, repackaging, and labeling sterile 
medications, such as injectable and ophthalmic products. The Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) regards compounding as the practice in which a licensed pharmacist, a licensed 
physician, or, in the case of an outsourcing facility, a person under the supervision of a 
licensed pharmacist, combines, mixes, or alters ingredients of a drug to create a medication 
tailored to the needs of an individual patient [6]. Over the last two decades, pharmacies have 
taken on a more prominent role in compounding and re-packaging sterile products for 
hospitals, outpatient clinics, home health, and other healthcare settings, and sterile 
compounding practices have evolved to become more wide-ranging and complex [7,8]. 
These practices can sometimes include preparation of large quantities of sterile products in 
advance of prescriptions or in non-patient-specific fashion, often for distribution to multiple 
facilities and at times across state lines [8,9]. With this evolution in pharmacy compounding 
practices, new threats to patient safety have emerged.
Regulatory and professional standards for ensuring safe preparation of sterile medications 
have long-been established and have facilitated advancements in the quality and safety 
assurance of sterile compounding by pharmacies [7,8,10–12]. However, failures to adhere to 
these standards have been documented and these standards were not originally intended to 
address compounding activities at the large scale currently undertaken by some 
compounding pharmacies [7–9,13]. Consequently, compounding pharmacies have been 
increasingly identified as sources of contaminated products contributory to large and serious 
healthcare outbreaks [14,15]. The most prominent example of such an outbreak occurred in 
2012 and involved nationwide distribution of contaminated injectable methylprednisolone 
acetate (MPA) [16]. This incident, one of the largest U.S. healthcare-related outbreaks on 
record, was characterized by nearly14,000 exposed individuals and at least 751 cases of 
fungal meningitis, other infections, and stroke, including at least 64 deaths across 20 states 
[16].
The nationwide fungal meningitis outbreak was not an isolated incident. Since 2001, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), along with its federal and state public 
health partners, have responded to and investigated numerous outbreaks of infectious 
illnesses linked to pharmacy-compounded sterile preparations (P-CSPs). Here, we provide 
an updated and expanded overview of the burden and characteristics of outbreaks linked to 
Shehab et al. Page 2













P-CSPs, briefly summarize common forces driving the use of products involved in these 
outbreaks, and identify public health and patient safety lessons learned that could inform 
prevention of similar outbreaks in the future.
BURDEN OF COMPOUNDING PHARMACY-RELATED OUTBREAKS
We identified outbreaks occurring in the U.S. in which infections were linked to P-CSPs 
based on a search of internal data for relevant incidents reported to and investigated by CDC 
between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2013. We also searched Medline, CINAHAL, 
and Embase databases for reports during the same time period using combinations of the 
terms: disease outbreaks, drug compounding, compounding pharmacy, and infectious 
diseases. For the purposes of this overview, sterile products that were re-packaged by 
compounding pharmacies (e.g., contents of an already sterile single-dose vial re-packaged 
into multiple syringes without undergoing any additional manipulation of the drug, such as 
sterilization, at the pharmacy) were also considered P-CSPs. Food and Drug Administration 
notices of compounding pharmacy regulatory actions and publicly-available pharmacy 
inspection reports were also reviewed and used to obtain details regarding lapses in sterile 
compounding procedures that may have contributed to P-CSP contamination [17]. 
Information about clinical drivers for P-CSP demand was based on descriptions of 
indications for which compounded products were being used as provided in outbreak and 
related reports, as well as published literature.
We excluded outbreaks linked to products prepared in hospital pharmacies that were not 
identified as institutional compounding pharmacies [18,19] and products prepared in 
specialty (e.g., nuclear) pharmacies [20], outbreaks where the source of contamination was 
extrinsic (e.g., product contamination due to mishandling at the bedside) [1]. Also excluded 
were CSP contamination incidents that did not result in infectious illnesses (e.g., those that 
led solely to pharmacy inspections, warning letters, or product recalls, but no reported 
infections) and incidents related to compounding pharmacy dispensing errors (e.g., errors in 
dosage calculation or mistaken active ingredients) [21–23], intentional adulteration [24], or 
veterinary medicines [25].
We identified 19 U.S. outbreaks since 2001 that were linked to contaminated medications 
prepared by compounding pharmacies [16,26–50]. These incidents were associated with a 
range of 2 to 751 cases (Table 1); almost one-half (8/19) of these incidents involved deaths 
possibly related to exposure to contaminated P-CSPs [16,26,28,32,36,41,45,50]. The exact 
numbers of CSPs dispensed or distributed each year by compounding pharmacies is not 
known, but the current figure is likely in the tens of millions [51], with at least two-thirds of 
U.S. hospitals reporting reliance on outside pharmacies for CSPs [52,53]. Although the 
number of recognized outbreaks linked to contaminated P-CSPs can be considered relatively 
small given these figures, these incidents are being reported with an increased frequency 
[14,15]. Additionally, these outbreaks have often resulted in devastating consequences to 
patients, including serious adverse events such as blindness and life-threatening sepsis, a 
need to institute additional medical and procedural interventions, and fatalities [16,26,28–
32,36,39,41–43,45,50].
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The number of recognized outbreaks linked to contaminated P-CSPs should also be viewed 
as an underestimate for a number of reasons (Table 2). First, identification of healthcare 
outbreaks linked to contaminated medications, including P-CSPs, is challenging as 
identification relies on clinician recognition of a possible link between clusters of infections 
and a potentially contaminated product, followed by prompt reporting to public health 
authorities [4,54]. Outbreaks linked to P-CSPs, especially, present numerous challenges, as 
they have often involved products that are ubiquitous in healthcare settings (e.g., electrolyte 
solutions) (Table 1), thus clinicians may not readily recognize the medication as a potential 
source of infections. Further challenging clinician recognition of a link between a 
contaminated compounded product and an infection is the fact the most pathogens that have 
contributed to P-CSP contamination incidents to date, such as Pseudomonas spp. and 
Serratia spp., are common causes of infections that patients acquire during exposure to 
healthcare for a multitude of reasons other than exposure to contaminated medications [55]. 
Delayed presentation of infectious symptoms after exposure to contaminated P-CSPs has 
also been reported with certain types of contaminants (e.g., fungal pathogens) [43,56] and 
routes of administration (e.g., via indwelling catheter) [33], which can also potentially delay 
identification of an outbreak.
Second, compounding pharmacies have been increasingly engaging in multi-facility and 
multi-state distribution of large quantities of sterile products [8,9], such that patients exposed 
to contaminated P-CSPs could present in widespread and disparate fashion. This poses 
additional challenges in finding a common link if there are only small clusters of infections 
across a number of healthcare settings [16,43]. For example, in one recent investigation of 
endophthalmitis infections linked to compounded Brilliant Blue Green intraocular dye, a 
cluster of infections reported from one facility prompted enhanced nationwide case finding 
that identified a second, previously unrecognized outbreak of endophthalmitis linked to 
compounded ophthalmic triamcinolone prepared by the same pharmacy [43].
Third, except for facilities that voluntarily register with FDA as outsourcing facilities, a new 
category of compounders created by the Compounding Quality Act enacted in November 
2013 [57], compounding pharmacies generally do not report adverse events from CSPs to 
the FDA. Since the onset of the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak associated with 
contaminated MPA [16,44], numerous compounding pharmacies have voluntarily conducted 
nationwide recalls of other CSPs [17]. Although some of these recalls involve P-CSPs linked 
to already recognized outbreaks, the possibility that other contaminated P-CSPs have 
contributed to infections that have gone undetected cannot be excluded. For these reasons, 
the true burden of HAIs from contaminated P-CSPs is likely higher than is suggested by the 
numbers of outbreak cases or fatalities identified to date.
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPOUNDING PHARMACY-RELATED OUTBREAKS
Contaminated P-CSPs have originated from 13 states, with 31 states and D.C. reporting 
outbreak cases [16,26–50]. Patients receiving healthcare in various settings, including 
hospitals, outpatient clinics, ambulatory surgery centers, and home healthcare have been 
impacted (Table 1). Almost one-half of recognized outbreaks followed spinal/paraspinal 
(e.g., epidural), peripheral joint, or intramuscular administration of the steroids 
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betamethasone or methylprednisolone (5/19) [16,26–29,44,46], or intraocular administration 
of the monoclonal antibody bevacizumab (3/19) [39,42,44,48]. The large contribution of 
steroids to compounding pharmacy-related outbreaks is likely a reflection of several factors. 
These include the widespread use of preservative-free steroid compounding to meet 
increased demand for epidural injections [58] and elevated risk of infection among recipients 
of epidural steroid injections imparted by immunosuppressive properties of steroid 
medications, route of drug administration, and underlying clinical characteristics of the 
patients receiving them (e.g., older age) [44,56]. The complexity associated with 
compounding steroid solutions, which frequently requires sterilization of non-sterile bulk 
active ingredients to produce a final sterile solution, also likely contributes to increased 
potential for contamination of this product [59].
The most commonly identified pathogens in infections linked to contaminated P-CSPs have 
been gram-negative bacteria (e.g., Pseudomonas spp. and Serratia spp.) (10/19) 
[26,27,30,33–36,41,45,46]. Infections associated with contaminated P-CSPs most 
commonly manifested as bacteremia (7/19) [30,33,34,36,41,45,50], endophthalmitis (5/19) 
[35,39,42,43,48], and meningitis (4/19) [16,26–29]. Other reported infections included: 
other spinal/paraspinal infections (e.g., epidural abscesses), joint infections, sepsis/systemic 
inflammatory response syndrome, skin and soft tissue infections, and flu-like symptoms 
(Table 1).
Contamination of P-CSPs leading to recognized outbreaks has been linked to deviations 
from established sterile compounding standards [16,26–29,31,34,39,41,42–50,59–67]. The 
United States Pharmacopeial Convention (USP) National Formulary Chapter <797> is a 
compendium of standards that describes practices intended to minimize the potential for 
microbial, chemical, and physical contamination during sterile pharmaceutical compounding 
across the domains of personnel competency, environmental quality and control, and quality 
assurance practices [10]. In outbreaks linked to P-CSPs to date, breaches in practices across 
all these domains have been identified (Table 3). Practices that involve manipulations of 
previously sterile (usually commercially manufactured) products, such as combining the 
contents of two commercially manufactured vials into a single syringe, are typically referred 
to as sterile to sterile compounding [10]. Non-sterile to sterile compounding typically 
comprises such practices as preparation of a final sterile product from non-sterile ingredients 
[10]. Breaches have been identified with both “sterile to sterile” and “non-sterile to sterile” 
compounding practices (Table 1).
Although all types of sterile compounding practices inherently possess the potential for 
contamination, approximately two-thirds (11/16) of the recognized outbreaks linked to P-
CSPs (for which information about compounding procedures was available) have been 
associated with non-sterile to sterile compounding 
[16,26,28,33,35,41,43,45,46,49,50,59,63,64,66,67]. In this type of compounding practice, 
properly conducted and validated sterilization processes are critical for ensuring the sterility 
and integrity of the final product. Sterilization of CSPs that originate from non-sterile 
ingredients can be achieved by filtration or autoclaving (sterilization by way of pressurized 
steam) [10]. Outbreaks associated with non-sterile to sterile compounding have in common 
deviations in these sterilization procedures [16,26,28,41,46,49,50,59,64,66,67]. Examples of 
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such deviations have included failing to verify the integrity of the sterilization filter, to test 
autoclave effectiveness, to autoclave CSPs for appropriate periods of time, and to 
appropriately validate the sterilization processes [26,28,41,59,66,67]. Deficiencies in aseptic 
practices occurring prior to or after the sterilization process have also been documented in 
outbreaks linked to contaminated P-CSPs compounded from non-sterile ingredients 
[43,45,50,59,64,66,67].
Outbreaks involving non-sterile to sterile compounding have also been linked to failing to 
perform adequate sterility and endotoxin testing of the final product 
[28,33,35,41,45,59,66,67]. Compounding pharmacies can outsource CSP sterility testing to 
independent laboratories; in at least one outbreak to date [16,59], quality control procedures 
at such a laboratory were found to be not in accordance with accepted standards [68]. 
Additionally, in 2013, the FDA issued warnings about the adequacy of CSP quality and 
sterility testing at another laboratory utilized by over 100 compounding pharmacies across 
32 states [69].
DRIVERS OF STERILE COMPOUNDING IN THE CONTEXT OF OUTBREAKS
Underlying the recognized outbreaks linked to P-CSPs are common driving forces for sterile 
pharmaceutical compounding that have served to catalyze and potentiate the impact of these 
incidents. Broadly, these drivers can be categorized as operational, clinical, and economic.
Operational Drivers
Since 2001, recognized outbreaks linked to P-CSPs have impacted patients in both inpatient 
and outpatient settings (Table 1). In inpatient settings, during the past two decades, 
operational driving forces have stimulated an increased reliance by U.S. hospitals on sterile 
medication preparation by outside pharmacies [7,8,52,53]. The shift to outsourced sterile 
medications on the part of hospitals was partially driven by a need to adopt more rigorous, 
complex, and standardized methods of preparing sterile medications, especially those used 
in high volumes and in customized dosage forms (e.g., electrolytes, anesthesia, parenteral 
nutrition, catheter flush solutions) [7,8,70,71]. In outpatient settings, the growth of 
independent ambulatory care specialty practices (e.g., ambulatory surgery centers and pain 
clinics) that frequently use sterile medications in high-risk procedures (e.g., epidural 
injections) has also stimulated an increased reliance on compounded sterile preparations 
[58,72,73]. Most of these types of outpatient settings are not equipped with the facilities or 
personnel required for safely preparing sterile medications and thus rely on compounding 
pharmacies to meet the demand for sterile products.
Clinical Drivers
Clinical demand for medications that have not been readily available through commercial 
channels is among the most important drivers for CSPs involved in compounding pharmacy-
related outbreaks. To date, almost one-half (9/19) of outbreaks linked to P-CSPs have 
involved sterile products that compounding pharmacies were supplying in response to lack 
of availability of a commercially manufactured product [16,26–28,41,43,44,46,49,50,74–
76], owing to either a commercial drug shortage (e.g., calcium gluconate) or demand for a 
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formulation of a product slightly different than what is available from conventional 
manufacturers (e.g., preservative-free steroids).
Clinical Drivers – Drug Shortages
Over the past few years, the U.S. has been facing unprecedented numbers of medication 
shortages, with the number of shortages tripling between 2007 and 2012 [77]. A recent 
government report estimated that from June 2011 to June 2013, generic sterile injectable 
medications, including those critical for day-to-day care of acutely ill or hospitalized 
patients (e.g., antibiotics, electrolytes, antineoplastics), accounted for almost one-half of 
shortages where alternative medicines were not available or the shortages affected multiple 
manufacturers and institutions [77]. Compounding pharmacies have responded to these 
shortages by preparing sterile injectable products from raw active ingredients. In a survey of 
a nationally-representative sample of acute care hospitals that participated in Medicare in 
2012, approximately two-thirds of respondents cited commercial drug shortages as an 
important factor when deciding to outsource CSPs [53]. Of notable concern, one recent FDA 
report found that, among manufacturers of veterinary medicines (for which shortages are 
also a concern), a return to production has been made less likely owing to manufacturers 
being concerned that the market share for their products has already been met by 
compounding pharmacies [78].
Clinical Drivers – Provider Demand
In contrast to drug shortages, other compounding pharmacy-related outbreaks have involved 
medications for which commercially available products are available, but do not quite meet 
providers’ clinical preferences. This is best illustrated by the outbreaks related to injectable 
steroids [16,26–28,44,46], the products that have most commonly associated with 
compounding pharmacy-related outbreaks to date. In most incidents, clinicians were seeking 
steroids without preservatives typically found in FDA-approved, manufactured equivalents, 
most commonly for off-label use in epidural injections [16,26,27–29,44]. Use of 
preservative-free steroids is preferred owing to long-held concerns regarding potential harms 
associated with preservatives administrated into central nervous system spaces [79]. 
Pharmacy-compounded injectable steroids for epidural injections can also meet clinicians’ 
preferences for these products in concentrations and volumes preferred for epidural 
injection, which can vary widely across practices and clinicians [80].
Economic Drivers
One important, but poorly-explored, driver of providers seeking CSPs in lieu of 
manufactured equivalents is the differential pricing between CSPs and commercial products 
[81–83], illustrated by the outbreaks linked to repackaging of bevacizumab [39,42,48]. 
Bevacizumab (Avastin®, Genentech/Roche) is a recombinant monoclonal antibody that is 
FDA-approved as a chemotherapeutic agent and is packaged in a single-use preservative free 
vial. Repackaged bevacizumab has been widely adopted among ophthalmology providers for 
off-label, intraocular treatment of wet age-related macular degeneration (AMD), the leading 
contributor to vision loss among older Americans [83]. A manufactured alternative to 
bevacizumab that is FDA-approved for the treatment of AMD (ranibizumab, Lucentis®) is 
available in sizes suitable for intraocular administration; however, re-packaged bevacizumab 
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has study-confirmed similarities to ranibizumab [84] and an approximately 40-fold cost 
difference exists between the two agents—$2,023 per dose for ranibizumab compared to $55 
per dose for bevacizumab [83,85].
Off-label use of bevacizumab for intraocular administration typically involves splitting a 
single bevacizumab vial into smaller doses suitable for intraocular administration in a single 
eye [86]. Because bevacizumab is supplied by the manufacturer in preservative-free 
formulation intended for single-use only, as with all sterile medications, repackaging 
requires extreme care to avoid contamination of the original vial and the syringes into which 
the medication is partitioned [86]. Re-packaging of bevacizumab under inadequate 
conditions to ensure sterility may pose a risk to a very high number of patients because 
compounding pharmacies are sometimes preparing tens to hundreds of thousands of 
bevacizumab syringes annually. Across all bevacizumab-related outbreaks to date, deviations 
from the processes critical for ensuring safe re-packaging of bevacizumab have been 
documented [38,39,42,47,48,62,65].
PUBLIC HEALTH AND PATIENT SAFETY LESSONS LEARNED
This overview of recognized compounding pharmacy-related outbreaks points to salient 
targets that can be addressed by public health authorities, regulators, compounders, and 
clinicians in efforts to prevent similar outbreaks from occurring in the future. First, almost 
all outbreaks linked to contaminated P-CSPs have been associated with non-patient-specific 
production practices that have gone beyond the original intent of pharmacy compounding—
compounding by a pharmacist, in response to a prescription, for an individual patient [6]. 
The recent passage of the Compounding Quality Act after the 2012 nationwide meningitis 
outbreak is expected to facilitate more rigorous federal oversight of facilities engaged in this 
type of compounding [57]. Compounding facilities that voluntarily elect to register as 
“outsourcing facilities” will be subject to requirements and oversight more closely 
resembling those applicable to drug manufacturers, such as compliance with standards more 
aligned with those for pharmaceutical manufacturing [87], mandatory reporting of adverse 
drugs events to the FDA, and inspections of their facilities by the FDA according to a risk-
based schedule [57]. The FDA has recently recommended that healthcare facilities that 
outsource preparation of sterile products obtain CSPs only from registered outsourcing 
facilities [88].
Second, with the passage of the Compounding Quality Act, there will remain a category of 
pharmacies engaged in more traditional compounding practices that are not subject to the 
same standards as those for outsourcing facilities. For these pharmacies, there remains the 
need to address poor adherence to sterile compounding standards that have been consistently 
identified across recognized outbreaks linked to P-CSPs. Compliance with sterile 
compounding standards, including those of USP Chapter <797>, is known to be highly 
variable [13,89]. Currently, not all state public health departments or boards of pharmacy 
uniformly incorporate USP Chapter <797> guidelines into state laws that govern pharmacy 
practice [90]. State public health departments and boards of pharmacy can play a critical role 
in facilitating more uniform application of and adherence to professional and regulatory 
compounding standards. Clarifying federal versus state oversight roles, improving state 
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resources and staffing to allow for adequate oversight, and enhancing communication 
between state and federal oversight bodies have been identified as important opportunities to 
strengthen public health protection from contaminated P-CSPs at the state level [91]. 
Improving professional and technical competencies of pharmacists and other providers in 
sterile compounding practices within didactic curriculums and experiential settings has also 
been recommended to help enhance knowledge of and adherence to sterile compounding 
standards [92,93].
Third, only a few commonly used sterile injectable products (preservative-free steroids and 
bevacizumab) formulated or re-packaged for off-label uses were responsible for the 
overwhelming majority of compounding pharmacy-related outbreaks, suggesting that better 
scrutiny of the drivers for demand of these products is warranted. For example, the use of 
epidural steroid injections for the treatment of chronic back pain is considered to be highly 
controversial owing to a paucity of evidence to support long-term benefits and recognized 
risks associated with administration of steroids by the epidural route [79,94–97]. 
Nevertheless, epidural steroid administration remains one of the most commonly utilized 
approaches to chronic low back pain treatment and the most commonly performed 
interventional pain procedure in the U.S., with millions of these procedures performed each 
year [58,96,98].
Likewise, the off-label use of bevacizumab for the treatment of wet AMD in lieu of its 
commercially manufactured counterpart has been increasingly explored as a means of 
achieving savings for Medicare and patients in the billions of dollars [83,85]. However, the 
safeguards necessary to ensure that bevacizumab is re-packaged safely for the purposes of 
intraocular administration have not been uniformly applied by compounding pharmacies 
[38,39,42,47,48,62,65]. National shortages of commercially manufactured products were an 
additional driver underlying the demand for P-CSPs in recognized outbreaks [26–28,41,50]. 
Manufacturer shortages of sterile medications that are critically relied upon across 
healthcare settings is currently receiving national attention from regulators and healthcare 
policy-makers, and attempts at mitigating the negative impact of these shortages on patient 
care are actively being explored [77,78].
CONCLUSIONS
As compounding pharmacies continue to play a prominent role in preparation and 
distribution of sterile pharmaceuticals across U.S. healthcare settings, the number, impact, 
and severity of infectious risks and outbreaks secondary to potentially contaminated CSPs 
may increase. Recognized outbreaks linked to compounding pharmacies have been most 
commonly associated with non-patient-specific re-packaging of sterile products and non-
sterile to sterile compounding. These practices were consistently characterized by lack of 
adherence to regulatory and professional standards for sterile compounding, suggesting that 
outbreak incidents are likely highly preventable with improved oversight of and adherence to 
such standards. Given the recent passage and ongoing implementation of the Compounding 
Quality Act, it is unclear what impact the new regulatory oversight framework will have in 
preventing these outbreaks. Regardless, improving compounding personnel competency, 
strengthening environmental quality controls, and implementing rigorous quality assurance 
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processes, especially during non-patient-specific compounding, will be critical for ensuring 
the safety of patients receiving compounded sterile medications. Drivers for P-CSP demand, 
such as off-label uses and lower costs, warrant closer scrutiny. Strong federal and state 
public health partnerships, as well as early recognition and notification of possible outbreaks 
on the part of clinicians, will continue to be critical in facilitating rapid identification and 
control of these types of outbreaks.
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Table 3
Examples of Common Deviations from Sterile Compounding Standards in Recognized Outbreaks of 
Infectious Illnesses Linked to Products Prepared by Compounding Pharmacies, United States, 2001–2013
Compounding Practice Domain Example Deviations in Standard Practices
Personnel Competency
• Lack in qualifications or training of compounding personnel
• Poor PPE practices (e.g., gowning, gloving, masking)
• Poor aseptic practices (e.g., contamination of syringes, needles, and clean space; use of 
single-use vials as multi-use vials)
• Lack of personnel follow-up, corrective actions
• Lack of documentation of personnel competency
Environmental Quality and 
Control
• Lack of adherence to USP Chapter <797> clean room specifications
• Introduction of materials from uncontrolled environments into clean work spaces
• Lack of adequate environmental monitoring (air, surface, personnel)
• Lack of real-time temperature monitoring
• Lack of documentation of maintenance and cleaning logs of major equipment
• Reliance on sub-standard base ingredients
• Lack of visible instructions for equipment use and troubleshooting
• Conflicting labeling/documentation of sterile vs. non-sterile raw materials
Quality Assurance
• Inadequate sterilization (e.g., filtration, autoclaving) procedures
• Inadequate or no sterility, endotoxin testing
• Limited to no follow-up on sterility or endotoxin testing
• Release of product prior to sterility or potency assurance
• Storage practices unsupported by safety or efficacy data
• Beyond use dating unsupported by stability or sterility data
Abbreviations: PPE = Personal Protective Equipment; USP = United States Pharmacopeial Convention.
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